Abstract: This paper studies how incentives are affected by intention-based reciprocity preferences when the principal hires many agents. Our results describe the set of agents' sensitivities to reciprocity required to sustain a given strategy profile. We also show that hiring reciprocal agents to implement a first-or a second-best contract will always benefit the principal if the strategy profile is symmetric. Instead, when the profile (first or second best) is asymmetric the principal's interest might be better served by self-interested agents. We conclude the paper by clarifying when symmetric profiles are most likely to arise.
Introduction
In the seminal paper by Mookherjee (1984) , the principal-agent model of moral hazard is extended to a multiple agent setting: Production depends on the entire profile of efforts exerted by the team of agents. The principal cannot observe the effort chosen by each member of the team and therefore designs wage schedules contingent on outcomes. Therefore, optimal contracts are chosen under a system of incentive compatibility constraints which take naturally the form of Nash equilibrium conditions of the underlying game between the agents.
Given that each agent must share the marginal benefit of his effort, but he alone bears its costs, teams are affected by free-riding problems which, in turn, might produce a (negative) psychological externality on agents. Therefore, teams seem to be a natural environment in which reciprocity plays an important role. Indeed, as we show in Section 3, the experimental literature on social psychology suggests that if a team member is sufficiently sensitive to reciprocity then he will reasonably have incentives to free ride if he believes that other players' intentions are bad, in the sense that they plan to exert a level of effort which is lower than the one they expect from him. Conversely, he will have incentives to work harder if he believes that his partners' intentions are good. In this paper, we address this issue and, building on the reciprocity motives previously described, we study how contracts are affected by intention-based reciprocity preferences when a self-interested principal hires reciprocal players.
More precisely, we include reciprocal agents in the Mookherjee's model so that the IC conditions appear as a psychological game.
1 Under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agents' actions as a psychological Nash equilibrium, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the attainability of the first best. Our results describe the psychological attitudes of the team members required to sustain a given strategy profile in equilibrium. Therefore they could give useful insights for hiring and team design as it is a common practice in many businesses to screen non-cognitive traits of would-be employees through psychological testing (see Remark 1 in Section 4 for more details and references). The agents' psychological characteristics used to prove the previous results are not sufficient to attain the first best if partners can collude. We show that additional psychological assumptions allow for the collusion-proof implementation of the first best. Moreover, we ask whether hiring reciprocal agents would increase or decrease the net benefit of the principal. It turns out that a principal will always prefer reciprocal agents to implement a first-or a second-best contract if the strategy profile is symmetric and show, by way of examples, that whenever the first-or the second-best profiles are asymmetric the principal might prefer self-interested to intention-based reciprocity agents. Finally, since our previous results have underlined the important role played by symmetry for reciprocity to be in the principal's interest, we conclude the paper by clarifying when symmetric profiles are most likely to arise.
Several papers have studied the welfare properties of the optimal incentive schemes in a principal-many agents problem (Holmstrom 1982; Demski and Sappington 1984; Mookherjee 1984; Malcomson 1986 ) and have attempted to solve the problems arising from the fact that those incentive schemes might not implement the principal's chosen vector of actions as a unique equilibrium (Demski and Sappington 1984; Mookherjee 1984; Ma 1988) . However, the role of reciprocity was not addressed in these early literature. More recently, experimental evidence in Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) has suggested that reciprocal motives contribute to the enforcement of contracts. In this vein, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) , Englmaier and Leider (2012) and Netzer and Schmutzler (2010) all show that efficiency is generally increased when a materialistic principal interacts with a reciprocal agent.
2 Our contribution extends the study of the role played by reciprocity to the multiple agent case. The present paper is also related to a growing literature that studies the impact of inequity aversion in multiple agent models (Itoh 2004; Demougin and Fluet 2006; Rey Biel 2008) . These articles find that when there are multiple agents who care about the final monetary distributions among each other, the principal can exploit their nature by designing interdependent contracts. However, "reciprocity and inequity aversion are distinct motives, and often intention matters more, in particular in the domain of punishing behavior, as suggested by recent evidence" (Itoh 2004 ). Accordingly, in our model contracts are affected in a different way with respect to inequity aversion models since a team member may react badly to other agents' free-riding regardless of everyone's rewards. Moreover, we show that -if intentions are the driving motivethe principal is more likely to exploit it if first-or second-best strategy profiles are symmetric.
Recently, Stone (2010 and have developed a meritocratic notion of equity which can be seen as a generalization of distributional concern models to situation in which effort affects the distribution that is perceived to be fair. While this notion of equity is able to generate behavior consistent with reciprocity, the mechanism which introduces reciprocity into their framework is different to that which drives intention-based theories. 3 Finally, in De Marco and Immordino (2013) , we study the impact of intention-based reciprocity preferences on the free-riding problem arising in nonstochastic partnerships. We suggest a tendency of efficient partnerships to consist of members whose sensitivity to reciprocity is -individually or jointlysufficiently high and construct associated reciprocity based sharing rules. The analysis in this paper is motivated by this result, and it extends the theoretical framework developed in our companion paper to encompass the more complex setting where a principal can write optimal contracts to incentivize the agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, Mookherjee's many agent model is summarized. We introduce the psychological features of our model in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the implementation of the efficient strategy profile. Section 5 shows that reciprocal agents always increase the net benefit of the principal when the material second best is symmetric but not when the material second best is asymmetric. Section 6 deals with the collusion-proof implementation of the first best. In Section 7 we provide the sufficient conditions for a symmetric first-best strategy profile to arise. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are relegated in the appendix.
The moral hazard problem
We first introduce the moral hazard problem and to ease comparison we borrow most assumptions and notation from Mookherjee (1984) .
Agents' material payoffs
The model consists of a set of agents N ¼ 1; . . . ; n f gwith n ! 2; a set of effort levels A k for each agent and a disutility function G k : A k ! R for each agent. A ¼ Q k2N A k . Moreover, we assume that A i ¼ 1; . . . ; m f gfor any i. We denote by Q the finite set of outcomes and jQj ¼ ν. The probability distribution on Q induced by an effort (strategy) profile a ¼ ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ is denoted by πðaÞ where π q ðaÞ is the probability of the outcome q given a.
4 Denote also with JðaÞ the support of the probability distribution on πðaÞ, that is,
Each agent k has a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u k which is additively separable in the action chosen by agent k and in the payment received
4 This is different from Mookherjee (1984) and Ma (1988) , where there exists for each player k a finite set of possible outputs Q k ¼ fq
Our approach is more general and simplifies notation. We can adopt this more general approach because, differently from Mookherjee (1984) and Ma (1988) , we do not need any assumption on the probability distribution over output n-tuples.
where the principal's payment I k ranges in an interval ½I; " I. The agent k has a reservation utility u k and we impose the following Assumption 1. Each function V k is continuous, strictly increasing and concave over ½I; " I with V k ðIÞ À min a k 2A k G k ða k Þ < u k . Moreover, for every a k 2 A k there exists I 2 ½I; " I such that V k ðIÞ À G k ða k Þ ¼ u k . Finally, we impose the normalization V k ðIÞ ¼ 0.
Note that the previous assumption is substantially the one used by Mookherjee (1984) ; we just added the normalization V k ðIÞ ¼ 0 to simplify calculations. The principal's benefit from an outcome profile q is denoted by e BðqÞ and the principal's expected benefit is defined by
BðqÞ:
First best
In the first best the principal can observe the action chosen by the agents, and in light of Assumption 1 she can write contracts forcing any agent to choose any feasible action that guarantees the agent his reservation utility. If agent k was required to choose a k , the principal would pay him a sum of
if he chooses a k and I otherwise. The first-best cost to the principal from the effort profile a is then
. . . ; a Ã n Þ is the one which maximizes in A the net benefit of the principal, that is, the function P : A ! R defined by PðaÞ ¼ BðaÞ À C FB ðaÞ 8a 2 A:
Second best
In second best the principal cannot observe the actions chosen by the agents, hence payments may only be based on the outcomes in Q: An incentive scheme for player k is therefore a ν-dimensional vector I k ¼ ðI k q Þ q2Q 2 ½I; " I ν where the element I k q is the payment given to player k if the outcome vector q has occurred. A vector of incentive schemes is an n-tuple I ¼ ðI 1 ; I 2 ; . . . ; I n Þ, with i we denote the set of all vectors of incentive schemes. Given I and the effort profile a ¼ ða 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a n Þ, the principal incurs an expected cost
Given an incentive scheme I k and the effort profile a, the expected utility of agent k is
Then, given the vector of incentive schemes I ¼ ðI 1 ; I 2 ; . . . ; I n Þ, we define the game played by the agents with ΓðI Þ ¼ fN; A 1 ; . . . ; A n ; E 1 ðÁ; I 1 Þ; . . . ; E n ðÁ; I n Þg:
We now introduce the definitions of second-best contract and attainable firstbest profile.
Definition 1. A second-best contract consists in a pair ða; IÞ which maximizes the net benefit BðaÞ À Cða; IÞ subject to the constraints that IC) a is a Nash equilibrium of ΓðI Þ, IR) E k ða; I k Þ ! u k for every k 2 N. 
Reciprocity
Many experimental studies have shown that the relationship between principal and agent is complex and important: Delegation can be used to shift responsibility from the principal to the agent (Hamman, Loewenstain, and Weber 2010; Barting and Fischbacher 2011) ; workers are shown to care a lot about the principal's distributional concerns in general (Fehr and Schmidt 2004; Cabrales et al. 2010) and for the equity principle in particular (Abeler et al. 2010) . 6 Other theoretical papers have studied the reciprocity motives between the agent and the principal (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2000; Englmaier and Leider 2012; Netzer and Schmutzler 2010) . Here, instead we mainly focus on the reciprocity relations between agents. In principle, our analysis could be extended to include both agents' distributional tastes and their tastes for reciprocity toward the principal. However, the complexity of the simultaneous psychological interaction among agents and the dynamic psychological interaction between these and the principal would most likely obscure the analysis of the paper. 7 Although we prefer to concentrate our analysis on the understudied psychological interaction between agents, as should become clear by looking at the rest of the section, our model is still able to capture the agents' concerns for equity.
To complete the presentation of our model, we now introduce the psychological features and the equilibrium concept. As in our companion work (De Marco and Immordino 2013) , we innovate with respect to the previous 5 It can be easily checked that the second-best contracts can be equivalently obtained as the pair ða; IÞ such that (i) I 2 MðaÞ and (ii) a maximizes BðÁÞ À C SB ðÁÞ in A ¼ fa 2 A jLðaÞ 6 ¼˘g. 6 Maximiano, Sloof, and Sonnemans (2007) show that the strength of gift exchange between principal and agent in the lab is only marginally smaller for teams of four agents than for a single agent. 7 In the dynamic extension of the paper agents would update their beliefs about the principal's kindness after observing her proposed rewards. However, this approach would require to use the concept of dynamic psychological equilibrium (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009 ) and its refinements.
Reciprocity in the Principal-Multiple Agent Model literature in two main respects: the way we measure kindness (Section 3.1) and the agents' psychological utility (Section 3.2).
Measuring kindness
Following the literature, we denote by b kt 2 A t partner k's beliefs about partner t's strategy and by c ktk 2 A k partner k's beliefs about partner t's beliefs about partner k's strategy. Moreover, we denote by χ kt ða k ; b kt Þ the kindness of k to t and by λ ktk ðb kt ; c ktk Þ partner k's belief about how kind t is to him. The kindness terms are defined to be
so that positive kindness from k to t arises if partner k contributes to the outcome with an effort level larger than the one he expects from partner t: Moreover, partner k will believe that t is kind to him if the effort he expects from partner t is larger than the one he believes partner t expects from him.
In order to measure kindness we deviate from the previous literature that uses the concept of player's equitable payoff (see for instance Rabin 1993) , and we use instead the agents' level of effort since it provides a direct measure of each agent's contribution to the outcome. In the traditional model of reciprocity (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) , the strategy sets may represent choices of different nature so that the natural way to measure kindness is to look at the players' payoffs. However, when the action sets represent comparable choices (efforts), we can adopt the simpler approach to use the level of efforts.
8 Some evidence suggests that it could naturally happen that intentions depend explicitly on actions rather than on payoffs. In his seminal work on reciprocity, Gouldner (1960) dictates that one should repay (in kind) what another has provided for us. Cialdini (1993) notes that people tend to reciprocate through kind actions even unwanted gifts, as demonstrated in a 1971 experiment by Dennis Regan. 9 As noted 8 Despite being a more direct way to measure the agent's contribution (when the action sets represent comparable choices), our approach lacks the advantage of the equitable payoff concept of being easily extended to several different simultaneous and dynamic games. 9 During an experiment, Regan's assistant disappeared shortly bringing back a can of Coke for some of the subjects participating in the experiment. At the end of the experiment, the assistant asked the subjects to purchase raffle tickets from him. Those subjects who had received the uninvited gift, a Coke, bought more raffle tickets than those in the control group.
by Malhotra (2004) in many settings, there is an obligation to reciprocate regardless of the benefit provided (payoffs). In a work setting, Bowling, Beehrb, and Swader (2005) examine personality and reciprocity as potential antecedents to giving and receiving support from co-workers. They predict and find a relationship between giving and receiving parallel types of support. Summing up, the experimental literature in social psychology provides some preliminary evidence that reciprocal behavior is often in kind (of the same type received) and unrelated to the amount of benefit received (payoffs). In the rest of the paper, we focus on a measure of kindness which captures the idea that a partner may react to other partners' deviations from some symmetric outcome regardless of everyone's payoff. Of course, more sophisticated formulations of kindness which take into account also payoffs could be naturally constructed extending our definition of kindness. We emphasize that our formulation of intentions is simpler and -not depending on material payoffs -does not implicitly require any payoff comparability assumption. Finally, we give a first intuition about how our formulation of intentions could be tested. A critical element to design an experiment involves eliciting beliefs b kt and c ktk to measure kindness. A way to elicit players' kindness and incorporate it in a psychological game, without referring to material payoffs, is to invite participants to make guesses and reward good guesses with a quadratic scoring rule. Specifically, each partner k would be invited to report his beliefs about partner t's strategy and his beliefs about partner t's beliefs about partner k's strategy. This would be similar, for instance, to what has been done by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) in a work on guilt aversion or by Dhaene and Bouckaert (2010) to test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity. As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) , we should elicit beliefs after we collected the strategic choices so that "As our game is one-shot and we would not mention guesses until after strategies were chosen the beliefs elicitation should not affect participants' prior choices."
10 Elicited beliefs, together with collected strategic choices, might then be used to calculate players' kindness, reciprocated kindness and to test whether behavior, beliefs, and beliefs about beliefs coincide as required by a psychological Nash equilibrium.
Psychological utility
In order to specify the psychological utility function for each player, we introduce for every pair of players a loss function that assigns to each combination of kindness and belief about reciprocated kindness the disutility caused to one player by the mismatch between his and the other agent's intentions. Differently from the functional forms in previous reciprocity models, our formulation does not have their characteristic "explosive" feature. Some preliminary although not conclusive empirical motivations for the choice of this functional form originate in the experimental literature on trust games. Pillutla, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2003) conducted two experiments, which help to clarify the calculus of reciprocity decisions. In the context of a trust game, they find that participants returned considerably more money as more was sent, apparently as a function of felt obligation. This proportionality between one's intentions and the other's reactions is perfectly captured by our single-peaked preferences, which depend on the distance between the weighted kindness of k to t and partner k's belief about how kind t is to him. A limitation of the previous evidence is due to the fact in the game studied in Pillutla, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2003) trustor and trustee have different roles while in the present one players are symmetric agents. This limitation is also present in Vyrastekova and Garikipati (2005) , although the trust game is played behind the veil of ignorance, that is, before the roles are assigned to players. Those authors find that the more a subject believes to receive back, the more he/she will transfer in the trust game. Another important question is the motivation for money transfer in the trust game. The evidence available is contradictory: Gneeze, Gueth, and Verbonen (2000) find that the amount invested by the trustor into the trustee increases with the trustee's ability to reciprocate, suggesting that it is indeed the belief in reciprocation that motivates subjects' behavior; however, in a recent paper Attanasi, Battigalli, and Nagel (2013b) show that the number of trustees more sensitive to guilt is significantly greater than the number of trustees more sensitive to reciprocity.
To specify more formally the psychological utility function for every pair of players ðk; tÞ, we introduce the reciprocity term h kt of k with respect to t which assigns to each combination of kindness χ kt and belief about reciprocated kindness λ ktk the disutility caused by the distance between the weighted kindness ω kt χ kt of k to t and λ ktk ; that is,
where ω kt is a real valued function of the variables a k ; b kt ; I . Then, the overall (psychological) utility function of player k is defined by
and is made up by the sum of the material payoff E k ða; I k Þ and the reciprocity term ρ k P t6 ¼k h kt ða k ; b kt ; c ktk ; IÞ h i . The parameter ρ k and the vector of functions ω k ¼ ðω kt Þ t6 ¼k summarize the psychological characteristics of each player k: ρ k > 0 measures the relative importance (the weight) of the psychological term with respect to the material payoff; instead, the function ω kt relates the relative importance of player k's intentions -toward the others -to his beliefs about player t's intentions.
The fact that ω kt is a real valued function of a k ; b kt and I gives a lot of flexibility in interpreting this effect from a psychological and behavioral point of view. Indeed, the agent reaction can depend both on how much he thinks the other agents will contribute and on the principal's rewards.
11 A specific functional form could, for instance, capture the empirically relevant workers' interest for the equity principle, i.e. the result that receiving lower payments while exerting higher effort leads to lower performance (Abeler et al. 2010 ).
12
Each ω kt is assumed to be positive, meaning that, for a given b kt ; c ktk and I , the optimal kindness of player k (taking into account only h kt ) is obtained by choosing a k so that χ kt ¼ λ ktk =ω kt , which reciprocates kind behavior (λ ktk > 0) with kind behavior (χ kt > 0) and unkind behavior (λ ktk < 0) with unkind behavior (χ kt < 0).
13
Moreover, the magnitude of ω kt affects the optimal kindness which increases in absolute value as ω kt decreases. Finally, when ω kt ¼ 1, the optimal kindness perfectly reciprocates the believed kindness, i.e. χ kt ¼ λ ktk . We only need to assume that inf a k ;b kt ;I ω kt ða k ; b kt ; IÞ > 0 and sup a k ;b kt ;I ω kt ða k ; b kt ; IÞ < þ 1. 14 A remarkable characteristic of the present formulation of the reciprocity term h kt is that it is free from the explosive feature that characterizes the functional forms of previous reciprocity models such as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) where h kt ¼ χ kt λ ktk or Rabin (1993) where
Indeed, in all functional forms in which h kt diverges positively (negatively) with 11 The vector of functions ω k could be simply seen as a fixed and exogenous psychological characteristic of agent k. For the formal analysis of this case, see the working paper version of this paper (De Marco and Immordino 2012) . 12 Notice that despite being more flexible, our choice of characterizing a player's sensitivity to reciprocity through two (ω and ρ) parameters rather than one can make more difficult its experimental elicitation. 13 ω kt ¼ 0 is excluded, since regardless of k's kindness, k's overall utility would be always decreasing in k's belief of t's (positive) kindness. 14 While both conditions are automatically satisfied when ω kt is continuous with respect to I, ω kt can be discontinuous.
χ kt and accordingly with the sign of λ ktk then there is no limit to how kind (unkind) k wants to be to t.
We are now ready to define the psychological game (derived from the game ΓðI Þ) corresponding to the psychological utility functions defined in eq. [1] . Let ρ ¼ ðρ 1 ; . . . ; ρ n Þ and ω ¼ ðω 1 ; . . . ; ω n Þ, then Γ ρ;ω ðI Þ ¼ N; A 1 ; . . . ; A n ; U 1 ðÁ; IÞ; . . . ; U k ðÁ; IÞ f g :
is the psychological game derived from ΓðI Þ and corresponding to the reciprocity vector ðρ; ωÞ. We conclude this section by recalling the equilibrium concept that will be used.
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Definition 3 (Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1989) . A strategy profile ða
Implementation of the first best
We start this section by redefining second-best contracts and attainable first-best profiles under the assumption that agents have intention-based reciprocity preferences.
Definition 4. A second-best contract under reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ consists in a pair ða ÃÃ ; I ÃÃ Þ which maximizes the net benefit of the principal, that is
BðaÞ À Cða; IÞ; subject to the constraints that ðP ρ;ω À ICÞ a ÃÃ is a psychological Nash equilibrium of Γ ρ;ω ðI ÃÃ Þ,
We emphasize that the psychological IC conditions in the previous definition provide the natural extension of the classical IC condition to the psychological setting, as the (material) Nash equilibrium conditions are here replaced by the 15 In the rest of the paper, a ÃÃ will usually denote an equilibrium and a Ã a symmetric equilibrium.
psychological Nash equilibrium conditions. Note also that, in the psychological IR conditions, beliefs are not arbitrary but they are assumed to be consistent with the equilibrium conditions. We finally point out that (only) for symmetric profiles, the psychological IR conditions coincide with the (material) IR conditions.
Definition 5. The first-best effort profile a ÃÃ is said to be attainable under reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ if there exist incentive schemes I such that ða ÃÃ ; IÞ satisfies (P ρ;ω -IR) and (P ρ;ω -IC) and Cða ÃÃ ; IÞ ¼ C FB ða ÃÃ Þ.
Let a Ã be a symmetric first-best effort profile and b I be the incentive schemes defined, for every k 2 N and q 2 Q, bŷ
( ½2 Then, we denote by
the minimum that ω kt can attain given ðb Ã kt Þ t6 ¼k and b I: Moreover, let
be the upper bound to the cost saving from an unilateral deviation for agent k.
We are now ready to state our sufficient condition for the attainability of a symmetric first-best profile. Proposition 1. Let a Ã be a (material) symmetric first-best profile. If
for every player k then a Ã is attainable under reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ.
The proof of the previous proposition shows that, under the vector of incentive schemes b I, a Ã satisfies (P ρ;ω -IR) and (P ρ;ω -IC) and
Some more notation is needed to state our necessary conditions for the attainability of a symmetric first-best profile. Define 
measures the mean probability of reaching some outcome q outside the support Jða Ã Þ; by unilaterally deviating from a Ã k for agent k: Then, the next proposition gives necessary conditions for a symmetric strategy profile to be implemented by a psychological equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Assume that each function V k is strictly concave and let a Ã be the (material) symmetric first-best profile and
If a Ã is attainable under reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ, then, for every k 2 N, it follows
The next example shows a case in which the first best is not attainable in the game with material payoffs but it becomes attainable for conveniently chosen psychological parameters.
Example 1: Consider a game with two agents with strategy sets A 1 ¼ A 2 ¼ f1; 2g with the random outcome having the following support Q ¼ fq 1 ; q 2 g. Agents' costs of effort are defined by G 1 ð1Þ ¼ 1=3, G 1 ð2Þ ¼ 1, G 2 ð1Þ ¼ 1=3 and G 2 ð2Þ ¼ 1 while agents' reservation utilities are u 1 ¼ u 2 ¼ 0. Moreover, the utility functions are V k ðIÞ ¼ ffiffi I p for each k ¼ 1; 2 (note that the assumption V k ðIÞ ¼ 0 implies I ¼ 0). The probability distributions πðaÞ ¼ ðπ q1 ðaÞ; π q2 ðaÞÞ on Q induced by the strategy profiles a 2 A 1 Â A 2 are given by πð2; 2Þ ¼ ð1=2; 1=2Þ, πð1; 2Þ ¼ πð2; 1Þ ¼ πð1; 1Þ ¼ ð0; 1Þ. It can be easily checked that C Bðq 1 Þ ¼ 6 and e Bðq 2 Þ ¼ 0 then her net benefits, defined by
FB ða 2 Þ, are Pð2; 2Þ ¼ 1, Pð2; 1Þ ¼ À10=9, Pð1; 2Þ ¼ À10=9 and Pð1; 1Þ ¼ À2=9. Hence, the first best would be obtained by implementing ð2; 2Þ at the cost C FB ð2; 2Þ ¼ 2. However, since the functions V k are strictly concave, the first best would be attainable only if ð2; 2Þ is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined by incentive schemes that give the first-best cost on the support of ð2; 2Þ: That is b I k q 1
It follows that ð2; 2Þ is not a Nash equilibrium for the resulting game with material payoffs Suppose now that the agents are reciprocal. Denote with a Ã ¼ ða
for t 6 ¼ k be the first-and second-order beliefs consistent with ða
With an abuse of notation denote ω kt ða k ¼ 1; b Ã kt ; b IÞ with ω k . Hence, in our 2 Â 2 example, psychological utilities take the following form:
and similarly
Reciprocity in the Principal-Multiple Agent Model
Therefore if ρ 1 ω 2 1 ! 2=3 and ρ 2 ω 2 2 ! 2=3 it follows that
Hence, it immediately follows that a Ã is a psychological Nash equilibrium of Remark 1: As in previous theoretical works on reciprocity, our analysis has assumed that the parameter of reciprocity is publicly known. This is key since otherwise we would be facing a psychological game with incomplete information, which due to its complexity has not been introduced yet in the literature at least at a general level. 16 However, the common knowledge assumption is not completely implausible if the reciprocity parameters can be related to personality traits and learned through psychological testing. This conjecture is corroborated by the practice common in many businesses of screening non-cognitive traits of wouldbe employees through psychological testing. Several decades of research in this tradition have produced a widely shared consensus taxonomy of personality traits, the so-called five-factor model (Almlund et al. 2011) . According to this model, the main personality traits can be summarized under five broad categories: extraversion, emotional stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience. Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from Dohmen et al. (2008) , which find that agreeableness (the tendency to act in a cooperative, unselfish manner), conscientiousness (the tendency to be organized, responsible, and hardworking) and emotional stability (predictability and consistency in emotional reactions, with absence of rapid mood changes) are associated with reciprocity. In this view, personality traits could give useful insights for team design. For instance, one of the implications of our analysis (in symmetric contests) is that the agents' conscientiousness, agreeableness and emotional stability are valuable for the principal. However, at least two objections lead to the conclusion that more evidence is needed to assess the realism of the common knowledge assumption. First, while in Dohmen et al. (2008) the coefficients on some of the five-factor category of traits are significant, the overall fit of the regression is quite low. Second, while for the principal it is relatively easy to access data about her agents' psychological traits through interviews, questionnaires, etc., those same traits can be learned by fellow agents only through repeated interaction, an ingredient not analyzed in the present paper. The next example shows that our model of reciprocity may have a negative effect on asymmetric profiles and in particular it renders unattainable first-best contracts which were attainable in the game with material payoffs.
Example 2: Consider the game presented in the previous example except that now costs of effort are defined by G 1 ð1Þ ¼ 0:6, G 1 ð2Þ ¼ 1, G 2 ð1Þ ¼ 0:6 and G 2 ð2Þ ¼ 1 and the probability distributions over Q are given by πð2; 1Þ ¼ ð1; 0Þ, πð1; 2Þ ¼ πð2; 2Þ ¼ πð1; 1Þ ¼ ð1=2; 1=2Þ. The utility functions are the identities, i.e. It can be checked that the asymmetric strategy profile ð2; 1Þ is a Nash equilibrium and the IC conditions are satisfied. Now we show that, with a reciprocal player 1, the strategy profile ð2; 1Þ is not a psychological Nash equilibrium and therefore the P ρ;ω -IC conditions are not satisfied. Denote with a ÃÃ ¼ ða Recalling that 
which implies that ð2; 1Þ is not a psychological Nash equilibrium of Γ ρ;ω ð b IÞ. The previous example has shown that (in our reciprocity model) asymmetric first-best profiles -which were attainable under material payoffs -may not satisfy the psychological IC conditions for a large set of psychological parameters. However, there are no general results which state that the psychological equilibrium concept selects only symmetric profiles. Instead, in Section 6, we show that the concept of strong psychological equilibrium selects only symmetric profiles for a suitable choice of the psychological parameters. In particular, the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix shows that reciprocal agents have always incentives to jointly deviate from any asymmetric strategy profile to the symmetric first-best profile. On the contrary, Example 3 emphasizes that any kind of strategy profile (symmetric or asymmetric) can potentially emerge as a psychological Nash equilibrium. Hence, given reciprocity parameters such that the first best is attainable in the corresponding psychological game between the agents, other asymmetric profiles can emerge as psychological equilibria of the same game. The idea of the example is that, given an asymmetric strategy profile, an agent -who is not exerting the highest or the lowest level of effortsimultaneously perceives strictly positive kindness from a not empty group of opponents and strictly negative kindness from another not empty group of opponents. Hence, any deviation from his strategy will simultaneously increase the psychological disutility from one group and decrease the disutility from the other. Therefore, if this agent is driven only by psychological motives, his strategy will be the unique best response for a suitable choice of reciprocity parameters. Reasonably, this strategy could emerge as a best response in the psychological game even if it was not a best response in the game with material payoffs. To give the intuition of these arguments by avoiding confounding details, in Example 3, we consider the particular case in which material payoffs are identically null. It is important to emphasize that if the kindness terms are built upon material payoffs (as the standard Rabin's model based on the notion of equitable payoff), then there are no psychological effects in the game whenever material payoffs are identically null. So the following example points also a difference between our approach and the standard model. 
It follows that
which implies that a 2 ¼ 2 is the unique best response of player 2 to his opponents' strategy profile ða ÃÃ 1 ; a ÃÃ 3 Þ in the psychological game, whatever is ω 2 .
Principal's utility in the second best
In this section, we show that reciprocal agents always increase the net benefit of the principal when the material second-best profile is symmetric (Proposition 3 Proposition 3 establishes that reciprocity preferences make it less expensive to implement the material second-best effort profile whenever it is symmetric.
17
The next example illustrates Proposition 3.
Example 4: Consider a game with two agents with strategy sets A 1 ¼ A 2 ¼ f1; 2g, the random outcome has the following support Q ¼ fq 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 g. Agents' costs of effort are defined by G 1 ð2Þ ¼ G 2 ð2Þ ¼ 1, G 1 ð1Þ ¼ G 2 ð1Þ ¼ 0, while V k ðIÞ ¼ I for each k ¼ 1; 2 and agents' reservation utilities are u 1 ¼ u 2 ¼ 0. The probability distributions over Q are given by πð2; 2Þ ¼ ð1=2; 1=2; 0Þ, πð1; 2Þ ¼ ð1=3; 1=3; 1=3Þ and πð2; 1Þ ¼ πð1; 1Þ ¼ ð0; 0; 1Þ. It can be easily calculated that C 
=3Þ
iiÞ ðI
17 Note that the second-best effort profile of the psychological game may differ from the second-best effort profile of the game with material payoffs.
It can be easily checked that C SB ð2; 2Þ ¼ 8 and
On the other hand, ð1; 2Þ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Therefore C SB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 3 and
Analogous calculations show that ð2; 1Þ is never a Nash equilibrium, while C SB ð1; 1Þ ¼ 0. Now if the principal's benefits from outcome are e Bðq 1 Þ ¼ e Bðq 3 Þ ¼ 0 and e Bðq 2 Þ ¼ 36. It can be checked that the first best is to implement ð2; 2Þ at the cost C 1 FB ð2Þ þ C 2 FB ð2Þ ¼ 2. While the second best is to implement ð2; 2Þ at the second-best cost C SB ð2; 2Þ ¼ 8. In fact Bð2; 2Þ À C SB ð2; 2Þ ¼ 18 À 8 ¼ 10, Bð1; 2Þ À C SB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 12 À 3 ¼ 9 and Bð1; 1Þ À C SB ð1; 1Þ ¼ 0. Suppose now that agents have psychological utilities with reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on reciprocal players having constant functions ω 12 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ and ω 21 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ that we denote (with an abuse of notation) by ω 12 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ ¼ ω 1 and ω 21 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ ¼ ω 2 . Then, following the same steps as in the previous examples for the calculation of psychological payoffs, we get the following psychological equilibrium conditions for the strategy profile ð2; 2Þ
Such conditions tell that the strategy profile ð2; 2Þ can be implemented as a psychological Nash equilibrium under the following incentive schemes
and therefore the second-best costs under reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ are
implying that reciprocity reduces the costs of implementation of the second best, whenever the second-best profile under material payoffs is symmetric.
We now show by way of an example that reciprocity does not always benefit the principal if the material second best is asymmetric.
Example 5: Consider a game similar to the one in Example 4. Two agents have strategy sets A 1 ¼ A 2 ¼ f1; 2g. Again, the random outcome has support Q ¼ fq 1 ; q 2 ; q 3 g, agents' costs of effort are G 1 ð2Þ ¼ G 2 ð2Þ ¼ 1, G 1 ð1Þ ¼ G 2 ð1Þ ¼ 0, while V k ðIÞ ¼ I for each k ¼ 1; 2 and the reservation utilities are u 1 ¼ u 2 ¼ 0. The probability distributions over Q are now given by πð2; 2Þ ¼ ð1=2; 1=2; 0Þ, πð1; 2Þ ¼ ð0; 1=2; 1=2Þ and πð2; 1Þ ¼ πð1; 1Þ ¼ ð0; 0; 1Þ. It can be easily calculated that C 
=2Þ
It can be easily checked that C SB ð2; 2Þ ¼ 4 and Mð2; 2Þ ¼ ðI
On the other hand ð1; 2Þ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Therefore C SB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 2 and
Analogous calculations show that ð2; 1Þ is never a Nash equilibrium, while C SB ð1; 1Þ ¼ 0. If the principal's benefits from outcome are now e Bðq 1 Þ ¼ 0, e Bðq 2 Þ ¼ 10 and e Bðq 3 Þ ¼ 2. It can be checked that the first best is to implement ð1; 2Þ at the cost C FB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 1. While the second best is to implement ð1; 2Þ at the
second-best cost C SB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 2. In fact Bð2; 2Þ À C SB ð2; 2Þ ¼ 5 À 4 ¼ 1, Bð1; 2Þ À C SB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 6 À 2 ¼ 4 and Bð1; 1Þ À C SB ð1; 1Þ ¼ 2. Suppose now that agents have psychological utilities with reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on reciprocal players having constant functions ω 12 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ and ω 21 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ that we denote (with an abuse of notation) by ω 12 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ ¼ ω 1 and ω 21 ðÁ; Á; ÁÞ ¼ ω 2 . Following the same steps as in the previous examples for the calculation of psychological utilities, we get the following psychological equilibrium conditions for the strategy profile ð2; 2Þ:
For ð1; 2Þ, we have the following equilibrium conditions:
Then, the equilibrium conditions tell that the strategy profile ð2; 2Þ can be implemented as a psychological Nash equilibrium under the following incentive schemes
Therefore the second-best costs is C Psy SB ð2; 2Þ ¼ 2. The strategy profile ð1; 2Þ can be implemented as a psychological Nash equilibrium under the following incentive schemes
and the second-best cost is now C Psy SB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 6. Therefore the second best under reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ is obtained, in this case, by the strategy profile ð2; 2Þ which yields a net benefit to the principal equal to Bð2; 2Þ À C Psy SB ð2;
18 Since Bð1; 2Þ À C SB ð1; 2Þ ¼ 4 > Bð2; 2Þ À C Psy SB ð2; 2Þ, we deduce that reciprocal agents may reduce the net benefit of the principal when the material second best is asymmetric.
Collusion-proof implementation
In the presence of many players, collusion-proof implementation of the efficient strategy profile is often an issue. In particular, in the (material) principal-multiple agents framework, Mookherjee (1984) investigates the effects of a principal who seeks to implement action pairs as a strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959) in the two-agent case. An equilibrium is said to be a strong Nash equilibrium if no subset of players, taking the actions of the others as fixed, can jointly deviate in a way that benefits all of them. This concept has been introduced for environments in which players can agree privately upon a joint deviation. In that case, any meaningful agreement by the whole set of players must be stable against deviations by all possible coalitions of players. More precisely, Building upon the work of Aumann, in our companion paper we introduced the definition of psychological strong Nash equilibrium which extends the Aumann's concept to psychological games. The definition is based on the idea that -since players commit ex-ante to a deviation -the deviants' beliefs should be consistent with the deviation itself.
19 More precisely,
n Þ is a psychological strong Nash equilibrium of Γ ρ;ω ðI Þ if it is stable with respect to joint deviations of each coalition T N: for every a T 2 A T there exists a player k 2 T such that i) U k ða 
19 Note that when we consider only deviations by singletons, this definition boils down to the definition of psychological Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it generalizes the Aumann's definition of strong Nash equilibrium which can be easily obtained by removing the psychological term from the payoffs.
In De Marco and Immordino (2013) , we found out that this concept allows for the unique and collusion-proof implementation of the efficient (symmetric) strategy profile in a classical partnership model. Now we address the question whether the psychological strong Nash equilibrium allows for an analogous result for symmetric first-best profiles in the principal-multiple agents model. Indeed, the condition used to prove Proposition 1 is not sufficient to sustain the first best if agents can collude. In the next proposition, we show that there exists a set of parameters ρ k and ω k such that the symmetric first best is attainable even if proper coalitions can collude. Whether the symmetric first best is stable also with respect to joint deviations of the grand coalition (and therefore a psychological strong Nash equilibrium), it depends only on the material payoffs, meaning that only the (first best) incentive schemes prevent from the joint deviations of the grand coalition. Indeed, as it can be easily deduced from the definition of the psychological strong Nash equilibrium, in the agents' psychological utilities -corresponding to a deviation of the grand coalition from a symmetric strategy profile toward another symmetric strategy profile -the psychological terms disappear and therefore psychological utilities coincide with material payoffs. Finally, whenever the symmetric first-best profile is sustained as a psychological strong Nash equilibrium, then additional assumptions on the psychological parameters of the agents are needed to guarantee that it is unique. 20 7 A remark on symmetric first-best profiles
The previous results underline the important role played by symmetry for reciprocity to be in the principal's interest. It is then natural to ask when a symmetric first-best strategy profile is likely to arise.
20 Note that if a Ã is the (material) symmetric first-best profile and if ρ k ð k þ 1Þ 2 À h ðn À 1Þðm À 1Þ 2 > νða Ã Þ 8k 2 N, where k ¼ inf t2Nnfkg; ak 2Ak ; bkt 2At ω kt ða k ; b kt ; b IÞ, then every asymmetric strategy profile is not a strong psychological equilibrium of Γ ρ;ω ð b IÞ. The proof is in the appendix.
Reciprocity in the Principal-Multiple Agent Model
Given a strategy profile a ¼ ða 1 ; . . . ; a n Þ, denote with P n i¼1 a i n " # the integer part of P n i¼1 ai n and let μðaÞ ¼ ðmðaÞ; . . . ; mðaÞÞ be the symmetric profile in A defined by
Then, the proposition immediately follows Proposition 5. Assume that, i) the function B is increasing in the sum of agents' efforts, i.e.
ii) C FB ðμðaÞÞ C FB ðaÞ for every a 2 A.
Then there exists at least a symmetric first-best profile.
The proof is obvious since Bðμða Ã ÞÞ À C FB ðμða Ã ÞÞ ! Bða Ã Þ À C FB ða Ã Þ which implies that if a Ã is a first-best profile then also μða Ã Þ is a first-best profile.
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In the next lemma, we provide sufficient conditions to obtain condition (ii) in Proposition 5 in the case agents are symmetric. For the sake of simplicity, denote in this case A 1 ¼ Á Á Á ¼ A n ¼ f1; . . . ; mg ¼ Ã. Moreover, for every x 2 ½1; m denote with NðxÞ ¼ fs 2 Ã j such that k x À s k 1g the discrete neighborhood of x. Then 21 If the strategy sets were closed convex subsets of finite dimensional spaces, then condition (ii) in Proposition 5 could be replaced by C FB convex and by the following property:
22 Note that the discretely strict convexity assumption used in the lemma is stronger than the discretely convexity assumption introduced in Miller (1971) where the max in eq.
[5] is replaced with min. Moreover, it can be easily checked that -in the continuous (strategy set) case -if we replace condition (ii) in Proposition 5 with the assumption that agents are symmetric with a convex cost function c then we obtain again the existence of a symmetric first-best profile.
This section has shown that symmetric first-best profiles arise naturally when the principal's benefit increases in the total amount of effort provided by the agents and the first-best cost features a convexity-like property. Note that the discrete strict convexity of C k FB follows from the analogous property for agent k disutility function G k : Finally, notice that those assumptions are only sufficient and it is simple to find examples where the first-best profile is symmetric despite the previous assumptions are not satisfied.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the impact of intention-based reciprocity preferences on the multiple agent model. Our main result is that a principal will always prefer to hire reciprocal agents to implement a contract when the strategy profile is symmetric, while if profiles are asymmetric she might prefer self-interested to intention-based reciprocity agents. Moreover, we describe the agents' psychological characteristics required to sustain a given strategy profile. Finally, since our main results underline the important role played by symmetry for reciprocity to be in the principal's best interest, we show when symmetric strategy profiles are most likely to arise.
The current paper together with the companion one on partnerships (De Marco and Immordino 2013) studies natural environments for reciprocity to play a central role and are intended to be a step toward the economic analysis of teamwork and optimal team design in the presence of reciprocal agents. An important by-product of our analysis is to demonstrate that, despite their apparent complexity, intention-based reciprocity models can be useful to study economically relevant settings in a novel and simple way.
Moreover, let b I k the incentive scheme of player k defined bŷ
Recall that by Assumption 1 we use the normalization V k ðIÞ ¼ 0: Then, we get
Hence, from the previous inequality and from eq.
[6] it follows that
which implies that
Since the previous arguments apply for every player k, then eq. (9) implies that a Ã is a psychological Nash equilibrium of Γ ρ;ω ð b IÞ, where each b I k is defined as in eq. (7). Therefore ða Ã ; b IÞ satisfies the condition P ρ;ω -IC. Finally, since for every player k it follows that
IÞ satisfies the condition P ρ;ω -IR. And the assertion follows. ■ Proof of Proposition 2. The first-best a Ã is attainable, then it satisfies the P ρ;ω -IR conditions. Notice that since a Ã is a symmetric strategy profile and P ρ;ω -IR involves correct beliefs then the P ρ;ω -IR condition is equivalent to the IR condition for material payoffs. Hence, following the same steps as in Proposition 5 of Mookherjee (1984) we get that, given the strict concavity of V, the principal can attain the first best only if each agent is paid a constant sum with probability one under a Ã . Given that the contract is optimal, agent k will be paid C k FB ða Ã k Þ whenever the outcome belongs to Jða Ã Þ.
As pointed out by Mookherjee (1984) in his proof of Proposition 5 we can assume without loss of generality that the principal always gives the minimum payment
From the assumptions, it follows that a Ã satisfies the P ρ;ω -IC conditions under incentive schemes b I , then it is a psychological Nash equilibrium of Γ ρ;ω ð b IÞ. Hence, for every player k, it follows that
where
Being V k ðIÞ ¼ 0 and taking the sum over a k 2 A k we get
Hence condition [4] holds and the assertion follows. ■ Proof of Proposition 3. Assume that ða Ã ; IÞ is a (material) second-best contract with a Ã symmetric strategy profile. Fix reciprocity vectors ðρ; ωÞ. Given the incentive schemes I and ε k ! 0 for all k 2 N, denote with I ε ¼ ðI
; . . . ; I n ε n Þ the incentive schemes defined by
It easily follows that each function g k is continuous and g k ð0Þ ! u k for every k. Denote with N IR ¼ fk 2 N j g k ð0Þ > u k g which is not empty by assumption. Then for every k 2 N IR there exists κ k such that g k ð k Þ > u k for all k < κ k . Hence the P ρ;ω -IR conditions are satisfied for every k 2 N IR and k < κ k .
For every k 2 N IR and every a k 2 A k nfa From the assumptions of the model it follows that η k > 0. Hence there exists " κ k ða k Þ such that
Since ða Ã ; IÞ is a (material) second-best contract then from the IC condition it follows that
Hence for k " κ k ; it follows that which finally implies that the P ρ;ω -IC conditions are satisfied for every player k in N IR and every k " κ k :
Consider a vector ¼ ð 1 ; 2 ; . . .
& Denote with I ¼ I . Previous arguments imply that for every k 2 N IR , the contract ða Ã ; IÞ satisfies P ρ;ω -IR and P ρ;ω -IC.
Now we consider players k = 2 N IR . Note that for k = 2 N IR it follows by definition that k ¼ 0 which implies that I k ¼ I and the assertion follows. ■ Proof of Proposition 4. From the assumptions it follows that, for every proper coalition T there exists a player k 2 T such that
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Following similar steps of the proof of Proposition 1 we get 
then every asymmetric strategy profile is not a strong psychological equilibrium of Γ ρ;ω ð b IÞ.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider an asymmetric strategy profile a ÃÃ , let T ¼ fk 2 N j a Hence, from eq.
[17], it follows that for every player k
